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Abstract
The environmental damage that occurs on a large scale has an impact on reducing biodiversity.
Biodiversity has an important role that is useful for human life and plays a central role in economic
development. This condition makes various parties aware of their role in preventing further damage.
Companies, whether directly or indirectly, owe a great deal to the environment. This study seeks to
examine the role of the Board of Commissioners as proxied by the size of the Board of Commissioners,
the proportion of Independent Boards, and the proportion of women on the Board of Commissioners as
a corporate governance mechanism for their biodiversity disclosure. The companies used as samples
are listed in the SRI-KEHATI index from 2018 to 2020. To measure the company's biodiversity variable,
we use a biodiversity index which contains 53 measurement items in 5 main themes. As a result, we find
that the size of the Board of Commissioners has a positive effect on the company's biodiversity
disclosure. Meanwhile, the proportion of Independent Commissioners and the proportion of women on
the Board of Commissioners are proven to have no effect on the company's biodiversity disclosure.
Keywords: Disclosure of Biodiversity, Corporate Governance, Characteristics of the Board of
Commissioners

Abstrak
Kerusakan lingkungan yang terjadi dalam skala besar-besaran berdampak kepada semakin
berkurangnya keanekaragaman hayati. Keanekaragaman hayati memiliki peran penting yang berguna
untuk kelangsungan hidup manusia dan memainkan peran sentral dalam pembangunan ekonomi.
Kondisi ini membuat berbagai pihak menyadari pentingnya kontribusi mereka untuk mencegah
kerusakan yang lebih parah lagi, tak terkecuali perusahaan yang baik secara langsung atau tidak banyak
berhutang pada lingkungan. Penelitian ini berusaha untuk melihat peran dari Dewan Komisaris yang
diproksikan dengan ukuran Dewan Komisaris, proporsi Dewan Independen, dan keragaman Dewan
Komisaris sebagai mekanisme tata kelola perusahaan terhadap pengungkapan keanekaragaman hayati
mereka. Perusahaan yang digunakan sebagai sampel adalah perusahaan yang tercatat dalam indeks SRIKEHATI selama periode 2018 hingga 2020. Untuk mengukur variabel pengungkapan keanekaragaman
hayati perusahaan, kami menggunakan indeks keanekaragaman hayati yang berisi 53 item pengukuran
dalam 5 tema utama. Hasilnya, kami menemukan bahwa ukuran Dewan Komisaris berpengaruh positif
terhadap pengungkapan keanekaragaman hayati perusahaan. Sedangkan proporsi dari Komisaris
Independen dan keberagaman dewan terbukti tidak berpengaruh terhadap pengungkapan
keanekaragaman hayati perusahaan.
Kata kunci: Pengungkapan Keanekaragaman Hayati, Tata Kelola Perusahaan, Karakteristik
Dewan Komisaris
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INTRODUCTION
The definition of biodiversity covers
the diversity of all life, both within and between species, containing everything that
exists in an ecosystem (Ketola 2009). The
existence of biodiversity is precious for
human survival and plays a central role in
economic development. Plants, animals,
and ecosystems distribute essential support
for human well-being (Jones et al. 2020).
Data from the World Economic Forum
(2015) declares that the current accelerated
rate of ecosystem damage and biodiversity
loss is one of the top ten global risk factors.
The World Wildlife Fund (2018) persists
that species extinction rates have increased
between 1,000 and 10,000 times more than
natural extinction rates. Ceballos et al.
(2015) state evidence that the current
extinction rate is arguably unprecedented in
human history. This concerns the future of
planet Earth.
Considering these conditions, this
problem requires solutions from many
parties, including the company. It is not
only the responsibility of environmentalists
or the government (Skouloudis et al. 2019).
Stakeholders should further influence
companies to contribute to maintaining the
stability of biodiversity (Mahyuddin et al.
2021). Stakeholders increasingly expect
companies to recognize their responsibilities to the ecosystem and comply with
their operational practices, thus reducing
the negative impact of the company's
operations and contributing positively to
biodiversity.
Research on sustainability reporting,
including biodiversity, can be expressed to
have started to emerge. The existing
literature has contributed insight into the
complex relationship between organizations globally and nature because they
indirectly have a moral obligation to
conserve and protect the biodiversity that
sustains many people's lives (Roberts et al.
2021). However, most research on this
topic is a qualitative literature study
(Mahyuddin et al. 2021). This limited study

concentrates on the extent to which biodiversity reporting is practiced in a company
in a country (Boiral and Heras-Saizarbitoria
2017; Rimmel and Jonäll 2013; van Liempd
and Busch 2013); developing frameworks
and measurements (Addison et al. 2020;
Houdet et al. 2020); Meanwhile, studies on
the factors driving the disclosure of corporate biodiversity, especially in terms of the
characteristics of the Board of Commissioners, are still rarely found. Roberts et al.
(2021) present that accounting for
biodiversity is an important topic with
extensive studies but still spotlights on
disclosures from annual reports using
qualitative analysis.
The research question that should be
raised is how companies respond to these
problems and how corporate governance
plays a role in preventing them (Galbreath
2012; Naciti 2019). Corporate governance
is associated with the mechanisms by which
corporate stakeholders organize control
over the company to management for their
purposes. The supervisory role of the Board
of Commissioners is a crucial component of
this corporate governance (John and Senbet
1998). The Board of Commissioners is
considered vital because it represents the
stakeholders overseeing the company to
suit their interests. The board is at the
pinnacle of strategic decision-making
(Fama and Jensen 1983). This position, in
theory, leads the board to incredible power
over how a company constructs strategy for
good not only shareholders but also the
environment,
nature,
and
society
(Elkington 2006). It is therefore important
to link the role of the Board of
Commissioners in corporate governance to
their biodiversity disclosure.
The governance mechanism is also
considered the company's system of checks
and balances. Because the strategic policy
on sustainability disclosure is crucial for
management (Bae et al. 2018). Sustainability disclosure researchers have analyzed
the effect of governance mechanisms on
corporate sustainability reporting. The
proxies that are widely used to measure the
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role of governance include the size of the
Board of Commissioners, the proportion of
Independent Boards, and the proportion of
women on the board (for example, Amran
et al. 2021; Haniffa and Cooke 2005;
Hussain et al. 2018; Naciti 2019; Tjahjadi
et al. 2021). With a large size of, the Board
of Commissioners can better represent
minority interest groups in the decisionmaking process (Bae et al. 2018). The
Independent Board of Commissioners
actively monitors and controls the board on
behalf of external parties. Therefore,
increasing independent commissioners can
reduce agency conflicts and send a positive
signal to outsiders (Hussain et al.
2018). While the proportion of women on
the Board of Commissioners is usually
considered to have an altruistic nature,
making it possible to influence decisions
and policies on the board on sustainability
issues, including biodiversity issues (Rao
and Tilt 2016).
From the existing literature, the disclosure of biodiversity is considered one of
the environmental categories in sustainability reports. Still, those that focus on and
specifically discuss the disclosure of
biodiversity are even now very limited
(Mahyuddin et al. 2021). Based on the
literature study by Roberts et al. (2021),
accounting academics have an increasing
interest in research sustainability topics.
However, there are still few researchers
who try to explore the responsibility of
organizations such as companies to the biodiversity crisis. The initial literature in biodiversity accounting was carried out by Van
Liempd and Busch (2013), which investigates the biodiversity reporting of companies in Denmark and provides several
suggestions to further improve their biodiversity disclosure.
Meanwhile, Rimmel and Jonäll
(2013) try to capture the motives behind the
disclosure of corporate biodiversity disclosures in Sweden. In the same year, Jones
and Solomon 2013 had 'provoked'
researchers to participate in increasing research on how organizations engage and
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contribute to preventing biodiversity loss
and raising public awareness. This is
important because of the seriousness of the
biodiversity crisis that continues to this day
(PBB, 2015; World Economic Forum,
2015; WWF, 2018). However, this 'provocation' has not received a wide response to
date. Haque and Jones (2020) examine how
board gender diversity is linked to the biodiversity disclosures of European companies. While Amran et al. (2021) examine
the effect of market diversification and corporate governance on biodiversity reporting
in the hospitality industry. Amran et al.
(2021) suggested that further studies be
conducted to see how far corporate
governance influences the company's biodiversity disclosure because, in their findings,
board characteristics such as board size are
not proven to affect the company's biodiversity disclosure. This could be due to the
limited sample in his research, which only
focuses on the hospitality industry.
Therefore, this study tries to answer
the challenges of Jones and Solomon
(2013); Roberts et al. (2021); dan Amran et
al. (2021). This research contributes to at
least three ways of thinking. First,
occupying the limitations of the literature
by trying to determine whether corporate
governance and the composition of the
Board of Commissioners influence the
company's biodiversity disclosure to
prompt the implementation of the SDGs
targets. Second, more detailed measurements is expected to provide a more accurate concept of the company's biodiversity
disclosure. Third, research in the
Indonesian context is critical given the
country's status as a megadiversity hotspot,
but there is a high danger of extinction and
a lack of stakeholder concern, particularly
about the involvement of companies
(Darajati 2016; Von Rintelen et al. 2017).
The next section will present a better
understanding of how, theoretically,
governance and boards involve corporate
sustainability reporting. We use stakeholder
theory and agency theory to justify why
companies report their biodiversity
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disclosure. Stakeholder theory aims at the
obligation of companies to report their nonfinancial performance due to pressure from
various parties (Freeman 2015), while
agency theory describes that an effective
board can minimize agency costs arising
from conflicts of interest between management and shareholders. This theory also
specifies that agency problems will be
trimmed by disclosing information related
to the company (Jensen and Meckling
1976).
Meanwhile, in section 3, we will
elaborate on the method used. Indonesia
was chosen as a sample country because it
has the highest biodiversity potential in
ASEAN and its surroundings. However, it
has the highest risk of losing its biodiversity
(Von Rintelen et al. 2017). Practicing the
SRI-KEHATI index, ten companies were
adopted as samples, and panel data
regression analysis was used to determine
the relationship between the board and the
company's biodiversity disclosure. The
variables used as a representation of the
composition of the board include; board
size, the proportion of independent boards,
and proportion of women on board. This is
based on previous studies that investigated
to explore the role of corporate governance,
although they did not specifically discuss
the disclosure of biodiversity like Amran et
al. (2021); Galbreath (2012); and Naciti
(2019). To formulate the biodiversity disclosure of each company, we use the
indicators developed by Hassan et al.
(2020). This index contains 53 indicators
from five main themes. Biodiversity
disclosure is a series of company actions
that are examined to have a positive impact
on the sustainability of biodiversity.
The last two sections, the results and
conclusions, will be presented comprehensively to answer the research questions and
the results of the hypotheses developed. We
assume that this research is far from perfect.
For example, the use of Indonesia as a
sample generates the results of this article
cannot be generalized. However, the results
of this study are sufficient to contribute to

the development of literature related to the
topic of biodiversity, have positive implications for related parties, including companies, environmentalists, and policymakers,
and make the public aware of the importance of maintaining biodiversity itself.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Theoretical Foundations
The relationship between sustainability and corporate governance has been
analyzed using various theories, from
agency theory (Bae et al. 2018; Naciti
2019); stakeholder theory (Naciti 2019;
Russo and Perrini 2010); legitimacy theory
(Amran et al. 2014; Haniffa and Cooke
2005; Matuszak et al. 2019); to signaling
theory (Bae et al. 2018). The number of
theories used by the researchers is because
the issue of sustainability can be identified
from various perspectives and dimensions
(Kuzey and Uyar 2017). Nevertheless,
based on the investigation of Hussain et al.
(2018) and (Naciti 2019). However, based
on the investigation by Hussain et al. (2018)
and (Naciti 2019), the dominant theories
used to link the role of corporate
governance and sustainability disclosure
are agency theory and stakeholder theory.
So, in this study, we will use both theories
in building hypotheses and explaining the
research findings. Therefore, in this study,
we will adopt both theories to build
hypotheses and explain the research
findings.
Agency theory explains information
asymmetry, opportunistic behavior, and
conflicts of interest between agents (management) and principals or shareholders
(Naciti 2019). Management typically
overcomes these issues by disclosing
information voluntarily to reduce agency
costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976), whether
it is a company's financial statements or
non-financial reports (Hussain et al. 2018).
Based on this theory, the corporate
governance mechanism plays an important
role in monitoring and supervising
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management behaviour. The representation
of governance that reflects the principal
interests is the existence of a board (Bae et
al. 2018).
On the other hand, from the point of
view of stakeholder theory, companies
worldwide face stakeholder pressure to
increase their sustainability disclosures
(Chen and Wang 2011). Stakeholders' need
for information encourages companies to
disclose not only their financial information
but also the company's non-financial
information (Haniffa and Cooke 2005).
Matuszak et al. (2019) also states that the
company will not be able to carry out its
long-term operations if it does not get
recognition and support from stakeholders.
In addition, companies must consistently
demonstrate their concern for the
expectations of these stakeholders
(Freeman 2015).
Biodiversity Disclosure
One of the important points regarding
corporate accountability with regard to environmental accounting in general and biodiversity accounting, in particular, is that
companies have broader responsibilities.
Not only fulfill the interests of shareholders
and stakeholders, the company likewise
keeps responsible for the survival of future
generations (van Liempd and Busch 2013).
Referring to the Brundtland report,
Sustainable development is defined as a
concerted effort to meet the needs of today
by considering the needs of future generations (Imperatives 1987), so that future
generations retain the right to enjoy the
benefits of biodiversity as humans feel
today because biodiversity holds an
important role in life. Not only does it
maintain the Earth's life-supporting
capacity, biodiversity also serves to provide
food sources and other 'ecosystem services'
such as waste decomposition, water and air
purification, pollination and disease control
(Schneider et al. 2014).
The definition of biodiversity is still
diverse. Nonetheless, most researchers
refer to the definition issued by the
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Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD /
Convention on Biological Diversity). The
CBD defines biodiversity as:
“Biodiversity means the diversity among
living organisms from all sources including,
inter alia, other terrestrial, marine and
aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part: including diversity within species, between species and
ecosystems” (CBD, 1992).

In the last two decades, there has been
an increase in information on the voluntary
disclosure of companies as well as
information about their performance and
concern for biodiversity (Atkins and
Maroun 2018). This is inseparable from the
demands of international stakeholders as
stated in the United Nations SDGs program
on targets 14 and 15. The 14th SDGs target
states that marine resources must be used
wisely to support sustainable development.
While the 15th SDGs Target states that all
terrestrial ecosystems must be protected,
managed and restored sustainably to
prevent biodiversity loss (PBB, 2015). To
clearly communicate the company's
concern for the environment, a globally
accepted conceptual framework, measurement, and language are needed (Potdar et al.
2016). Recently, there have been many
reporting frameworks that can be operated
by companies, such as reporting standards
from the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI),
the Task Force on Climate-Related
Financial Disclosures (TCFD), the
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board
(SASB), and the Carbon Disclosure Project
(CDP). Among these standards, GRI is the
most dominant environmental reporting
framework reported by many companies in
the world (Potdar et al. 2016). GRI is
generally considered the most reliable and
detailed (Atkins and Maroun 2018; Boiral
2016; Zhao and Atkins 2021). In the latest
version of the GRI standard, specific
disclosure items related to biodiversity have
been regulated in GRI 304. This enables
companies to comprehend the scale of
biodiversity better, allowing them to
provide more accurate and clear
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Table 1.
Indicators of Disclosure of Biodiversity According to GRI 304
Indicator
304-1
304-2
304-3
304-4

Description
Disclosing the location of the company's operations that are either managed, leased
or adjacent to areas of high biodiversity value.
Disclosing the significant impact that the company has made, whether related to their
operations, products, or services.
Disclosing habitats that have been restored or protected by the company.
Disclosing which species are affected by the company's operations, especially those
included in the IUCN Red List Species and each country's national conservation
species list.

information (Zhao and Atkins 2021). In this
standard, GRI provides guidance on how
companies should disclose information
about impacts or countermeasures against
biodiversity loss. These guidelines are
summarized in Table 1.
In the Indonesian context, in addition
to using the guidelines from GRI, public
companies are required to employ the
standards issued by the Indonesian
government, namely the Financial Services
Authority Regulation (POJK) 51 of 2017
concerning the implementation of sustainable finance. This aims to increase further
the company's awareness and commitment
to sustainability issues (Adhariani and Du
Toit 2020). Governments and companies
continue to work together to increase their
environmental and sustainability contribution. Evidence from the government can be
seen in several regulations and strategic
conservation plans, such as the Indonesian
Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
(IBSAP) 2015-2020 (Darajati 2016).
On the company side, they continue
to convey their sustainability performance
through sustainability reports. Even in a
more specific context, several companies
propose special reports on their biodiversity
performance, either submitted in the annual
report or on each company's website1. The
existence of this special report cannot be
separated from the ideas and decisions from
the board. Mainly in the Board of
Commissioners, which oversees the com-

pany's activities to align with the objectives
of shareholders and other stakeholders
(Glass et al. 2016; Hussain et al. 2018). The
board of commissioners also considers sustainability issues as part of the company's
strategic formulation, such as environmental and social factors, including
biodiversity issues. The board will also
determine what material sustainability
factors need to be identified by the
company. Finally, the Board ensures that
these factors are monitored and managed
(KPMG, 2017, p. 7).
Academic
research
exploring
accounting for biodiversity and nature
conservation is emerging (Zhao and Atkins
2021). Though, it should be noted that the
practice of the term biodiversity has not yet
found a consensus. Some studies apply the
term 'Biodiversity Accounting' (Adler et al.
2018; Ceballos et al. 2022; Ketola 2009;
Rimmel and Jonäll 2013; Skouloudis et al.
2019). Others utilize the term 'Extinction
Accounting' (Hassan et al. 2020; Roberts et
al. 2021; Zhao and Atkins 2021). Some
even call it ‘Animal Welfare Accounting’
(Sun et al. 2021), but it all boils down to the
same point.

1

and so on. One of the reports can be accessed at
https://sig.id/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/13.Laporan-kehati-SI-2019.pdf

Some of the companies we found made reports on
biodiversity specifically, among others; PLN,
Pertamina, PT Bukit Asam, PT Semen Indonesia,

Hypothesis Development
Board of Commissioners Size
From the various works of literature
that try to examine the relationship between
governance and sustainability disclosure,
the attribute that is widely used as a proxy
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for corporate governance is board size (Bae
et al. 2018; Hussain et al. 2018; Nasih et al.
2019; Sun et al. 2021). The board in the
company keeps a crucial role (Sun et al.
2021). In addition to supervising the
management in managing the company, the
Board also provides advice and more
indepth analysis of problems that are
currently or may be faced by the company
in the future (Bae et al. 2018). Based on
agency theory, the board is performed as a
representative of the shareholders to
monitor the company to minimize conflicts
of interest between the principal and the
agent, namely management (Fama and
Jensen 1983). Besides reducing agency
conflicts, the more diverse board members
can better represent minority interest
groups in the decision-making process. A
large board size also reduces disparities
through the ability to share skills,
experience, information, and resources
(Nasih et al. 2019).
However, the results of the relationship between Board size and the company's
sustainable disclosure are still fragmented
(Hussain et al. 2018). Several studies agree
that more board members can enhance a
company's sustainability disclosure (Bae et
al. 2018; Naciti 2019; Sun et al. 2021).
Other studies, as Hussain et al. (2018),
assume that a large number of Boards will
further diminish their efficiency in matters
relating to corporate decision-making.
Despite the variation in findings in
previous studies, more empirical evidence
concludes that board size possesses an important role in encouraging companies to
improve their environmental disclosure
(Bae et al. 2018; Giannarakis 2014; Naciti
2019; Sun et al. 2021), because a larger
board allows for a wider exchange of ideas
and innovative experiences (Giannarakis
2014). Members in it usually come from
various backgrounds, expertise, experience,
and competencies (Bae et al. 2018;
Matuszak et al. 2019). Therefore, a large
Board of Commissioners is more likely to
increase sustainability disclosures to reduce
stakeholder pressures and concerns about
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environmental damage, such as increasing
biodiversity loss. In addition, the large size
of the Board of Commissioners will represent a more diverse knowledge, education,
and background so that it will be more
effective in making strategic decisions
mainly to deal with sustainability issues
such as biodiversity problems. One way to
do this is by disclosing more information
about these issues. The first hypothesis in
this study is:
H1: The size of the Board of
Commissioners has a positive
effect
on
the
company's
biodiversity disclosure.

Independent Commissioner
An Independent Commissioner can
be defined as someone who does not have a
direct relationship with the company and
has extensive knowledge of a particular
field whose role is to provide advice and
consideration to other board members (Bae
et al. 2018). Based on agency theory, many
Independent Commissioners tend to better
monitor and control management, thus
making the company more transparent
(Naciti 2019). Meanwhile, based on stakeholder theory, an independent board represents all the interests of the company's
various stakeholders. This tolerates the
board to put more pressure on companies to
implement and disclose their social and sustainability responsibilities.
Sun et al. (2021) examine animal
welfare disclosure practices and what factors drive such disclosure at food companies in China. His findings reveal that a
high proportion of independent boards can
effectively weaken agency problems
through management monitoring and controling. Thus, boards with a high proportion
of Independent Commissioners are expected to urge management to provide a
higher level of transparency and report
more biodiversity information through corporate reports. Therefore, the second hypothesis in this study is:
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H2: The proportion of Independent
Commissioners has a positive
effect
on
the
company's
biodiversity disclosure.

Proportion of Women Board of
Commissioners
It is believed that women members of
the council will indicate greater sensitivity
to social and environmental issues that are
of concern to stakeholders today, including
biodiversity risks (Haque and Jones 2020).
This is also corroborated by Glass et al.
(2016) that women on the board are more
focused on long-term corporate decisions
and strategies and prioritize the wider
community's interests for sustainable environmental development. This is inseparable
from the nature of women, who are more
altruistic than men and more associated
with autonomous, individualistic, and competitive characters (Liao et al. 2015). In
addition, women on boards lean to encourage open discussion, share information,
and provide greater participation in the
company's sustainability disclosure. This
will indirectly upgrade the quality of
decision-making in the council, especially
those related to climate and biodiversity
issues (Haque and Jones 2020). Quality
board decisions will decrease agency
conflicts (Hussain et al. 2018).
Because the relationship between a
company's sustainability disclosure and
gender (women) is fiercely debated
(Matuszak et al. 2019), various researchers
have attempted to connect it with theories
from other disciplines. As done in the
research of Hussain et al. (2018), women
are more socially oriented than men.
Research that is more comprehensive and
pays special attention to the role of gender
diversity on board is Rao and Tilt (2016).
They find that there is global pressure to
increase the presence of women's boards in
corporate governance mechanisms and
from the works of literature gathered.
IDX, “Indeks Saham di BEI”,
https://www.idx.co.id/produk/indeks/, [Online],
accessed on 12 March 2021
2

Evidently, women can prove a greater
influence on decisions on boards. Liao et al.
(2015) and Naciti (2019) have also
provided empirical evidence on the
relationship between women's boards and
corporate sustainability disclosures. The
results show that women play an important
role in the company's strategic policies.
Haque and Jones (2020) mention that
there are two reasons why female members
on the board can increase the company's
biodiversity disclosure. First, women on
board members have greater sensitivity to
how to build relationships and share stakeholder concerns about environmental
damage, especially biodiversity risks.
Therefore, they will be more involved in the
company's sustainable strategies and
actions and continue to try to improve the
company's biodiversity disclosure. Second,
women on board members tend to
encourage open discussion and greater
participation. Besides being able to reduce
the level of conflict in the decision-making
process on the board, the contribution of the
women on board can also increase the high
quality of council decisions, especially on
climate and biodiversity issues. Therefore,
we hypothesize that:
H3: The proportion of women on the
Board of Commissioners has a
positive effect on the company's
biodiversity disclosure.

RESEARCH METHOD
Data and Samples
The samples employed in this study
are companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange incorporated in the SRI-KEHATI
Index. This index is published by the Kehati
Foundation containing 25 companies
performing well in supporting sustainable
development and have a fairly serious
concern for environmental, social, and
governance issues2. The SRI-KEHATI
index has been widely applied by
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Table 2
Sample Data from SRI-KEHATI Indeks Index
No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Kode
ASII
AUTO
BBCA
BBNI
BBRI
BBTN
BMRI
BSDE
DSNG
INCO
INDF
INTP
JSMR
KLBF
LSIP
NISP
PGAS
PJAA
PTPP
SIDO

Nama Saham
Sektor
Criteria 1 Criteria 2


Astra International Tbk.
Industrials

Astra Otoparts Tbk.
Customer Cyclicals
×


Bank Central Asia Tbk.
Financials

Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk.
Financials
×

Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk.
Financials
×

Bank Tabungan Negara (Persero) Tbk.
Financials
×

Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk.
Financials
×

Bumi Serpong Damai Tbk.
Properties-Real Estates
×
Dharma Satya Nusantara Tbk.
Consumer Non-Cyclicals
×
×


Vale Indonesia Tbk.
Basic Materials
Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk.
Consumer Non-Cyclicals
×
×
Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa Tbk.
Basic Materials
×
×


Jasa Marga (Persero) Tbk.
Infrastructures


Kalbe Farma Tbk.
Healthcare
PP London Sumatra Indonesia Tbk.
Consumer Non-Cyclicals
×
×

Bank OCBC NISP Tbk.
Financials
×

Perusahaan Gas Negara Tbk.
Energy
×
Pembangunan Jaya Ancol Tbk.
Consumer Cyclicals
×
×


PP (Persero) Tbk.
Properties-Real Estates


Industri Jamu dan Farmasi Sido
Healthcare
Muncul Tbk.


21 SMGR Semen Indonesia (Persero) Tbk.
Basic Materials
22 TLKM Telekomunikasi Indonesia (Persero)
Infrastructures
×
×
Tbk.

23 UNTR
United Tractors Tbk.
Industrials
×

24 UNVR Unilever Indonesia Tbk.
Consumer Non-Cyclicals
×

25 WIKA
Wijaya Karya (Persero) Tbk.
Properties-Real Estates
×
SRI-KEHATI Index for the period May-October 2020
1
ADHI
Adhi Karya (Persero) Tbk.
Properties-Real Estates
×
×


2
JPFA
Japfa Comfeed Indonesia Tbk
Consumer Non-Cyclicals


3
PPRO
PP Properti Tbk.
Properties-Real Estates

4
WSKT Waskita Karya (Persero) Tbk.
Properties-Real Estates
×
5
WTON Wijaya Karya Beton Tbk.
Industri Dasar
×
×
Note: This index is for the period December 2020 s.d. May 2021 based on Surat Edaran IDX No.: Peng00353/BEI.POP/11-2020. Criteria 1 (Company issues financial statements from 2018 to 2020). Criteria 2
(Company discloses aspects of biodiversity).

researchers and considered to have an important role since its launch on 8 June 2009
(Akhmadi and Januarsi 2021; Williams
2010). The list of these 25 companies is
shown in Table 2.
The observation period in this study
is from 2018 to 2020. We based this on the
last GRI 2016 conference, which revised
several standards, including aspects of biodiversity. In 2017 we issued it because,
based on our observations of many
companies’ sustainability reports, this
aspect has not become a priority. Therefore,
most companies have not disclosed it.
Companies that do not meet two criteria,
namely publishing sustainability reports

from 2018-2020 and reporting on
biodiversity aspects, are excluded from the
sample. Data is obtained from sustainability
reports and company annual reports.
From Table 2, it can be obviously declared that several companies have been excluded from the sample because they do not
comply with both criteria. The final sample
of this research is ten companies with three
years of observation. The data that is ready
to be analyzed is 30 observation data. This
meets the criteria for parametric testing in
the form of regression. To see more
definitely in what year the company did not
publish a sustainability report and/or report
on biodiversity, we present it in appendix 1.
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Variable Measurement
Dependent Variable
The measurement of biodiversity still
has not found common ground. Several
researchers are trying to formulate how to
measure biodiversity disclosure. Amran et
al. (2021), for example, attempted to
develop 11 measurement items based on
research from Samkin et al. (2014) and GRI
A more comprehensive measurement compiled by Hassan et al. (2020) by making 53
measurement items and dividing them into
five main themes, namely company reports
on current or previous actions (CPA/
Current-Previous Actions) recruiting 26
items, company prevention efforts against
future risks (PAF/Prevent Activities
happening in the Future) 8 items, a report
on company activities that have an impact
on natural sustainability (ELOSS/ extinction/biodiversity loss) 13 items, a report that
the company has followed several standards
related to biodiversity (FG/following guidelines) 4 items, and a report on fines received
or may be imposed on the company (FIN/
company fines) 2 items. In this study, we
used the biodiversity measurement index of
Hassan et al. (2020). The measurement of
each item can be seen in appendix 2.
The data was obtained by the content
analysis method, which was carried out by
the researcher himself. The measurement
uses a scale of 0 to 3 to consider the variety
and quality of information reported by companies. A score of “1” is given if the
disclosure of a particular item is general,
unclear, and contains little information. A
score of “2” is given if the disclosure of the
company's performance contains objective,
current, and verifiable information. A score
of “3” is given if the information displayed
meets the criteria for a score of “2” plus
specific information such as displaying the
location, affected species, fauna/flora that
have been successfully conserved, the number of funds spent, the company's structured
conservation actions on certain species, displaying the latest illustration to provide
evidence to readers of their performance
reports. Meanwhile, companies that do not

disclose any information on the item will be
given a score of 0. The total of all item
scores is a form of disclosure of the
company's biodiversity (Hassan et al.
2020).
To make it easier to find content
pages related to biodiversity information,
we run the GRI and POJK indexes which
are usually attached by companies at the
end of their sustainability reports. We also
conduct searches based on related keywords
to validate the findings so that no information is missed. These keywords include
“biological
diversity”,
“ecosystem”,
“species”, “rare”, “conservation”, “fauna”,
“flora”. and "habitat".
Independent Variable
We have four independent variables
in this study. We describe the measurement
of the four independent variables as
follows;

• Board Size (BoardSize)
• The size of the board of commissioners is
defined as the total Board of Commissioners
in corporate governance.
• Proportion of Independent Commissioners
(BoardInd)
The
composition
of
Independent
Commissioners is measured using the
percentage of Independent Commissioners
of the total board of commissioners in
corporate governance.
• Proportion of Women on Board of
Commissioners (Women)
the proportion of women on the board is
measured by the percentage of female
members of the board of commissioners on
the total board.

Variable Control
We tried to control the relationship
between the independent and dependent
variables by adding three variables based
on previous research (Haniffa and Cooke
2005; Hassan et al. 2020; Matuszak et al.
2019; Naciti 2019). First, the size of the
company is measured using log natural (ln)
of total assets. Amran et al. (2021) mention
that larger companies have a greater impact
on the environment because of their
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: α + β1BoardSizeit + β2BoardIndit + β3Womenit + β4FirmSizeit + β5Profitit + β6Levit + εit

BD
α
BoardSize
BoardInd
Women
FirmSize
Profit
Lev
εit

= Biodiversity Disclosure
= Intercept
= Board of Commissioners size
= Proportion of Independent Commissioners on the board
= Proportion of women on the Board of Commissioners
= Company size as measured using the natural log of total assets
= Company profitability, measured by the ratio of return on assets (ROA)
= Company risk, measured by the ratio of total debt/total assets
= Error term

The hypothesis is accepted if the p value of the tested variables is lower than 5% (p < 0.05).

visibility. In addition, larger companies will
get more attention from stakeholders. One
way to meet the high expectations and
pressures from these stakeholders the
company will try to disclose more social
and environmental-related information,
including information related to biodiversity. (Nasih et al. 2019). Second,
profitability is measured using ROA
(Return on Assets). Based on agency
theory, the management of more profitable
companies will tend to increase their socioenvironmental disclo-sures and issue them
in sustainability reports to maintain their
position and reputation in the market. (Bae
et al. 2018; Sun et al. 2021). In addition,
according to Haniffa and Cooke (2005),
management in companies with higher
profitability has the freedom and flexibility
to carry out and disclose wider environmental performance to stakeholders.
Finally, the company's risk is measured
using the ratio of total debt/total assets
(Leverage Ratio). Companies that have
high leverage ratios indicate poor financial
conditions. The literature states that highrisk companies use socio-environmental
disclosures, including biodiversity disclosures, as a means to reduce agency costs
(Bae et al. 2018; Naciti 2019).
Empirical Model and Analysis Techniques
To test the hypothesis, we employed
panel data regression analysis. The model
used is.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The data analysis and research results
will be elaborated through four stages.
First, all variables will be presented in
descriptive statistics to explain the general
picture of the data. This indicates the mean,
standard deviation, minimum value, and
maximum value of all variables. Second, all
samples' biodiversity disclosure measurement index will be displayed and classified
based on the index theme and data year.
Third, to avoid auto-correlation and
multicollinearity problems, we will present
the results of the Pearson correlation and
VIF (Variance inflation factor) tests.
Fourth, hypothesis testing will be carried
out using Generalized Least Squares (GLS)
regression following many other studies
that examine the effect of the relationship
between variables (Hassan et al. 2020;
Hussain et al. 2018; Sun et al. 2021).
Descriptive Statistics
In Table 2 above, our observations
from the sustainability reports of companies
included in the SRI-KEHATI index picture
that the company's attention to biodiversity
issues is very low. This can be generalized
to all companies on the Indonesia Stock
Exchange, considering that the companies
registered in the SRI-KEHATI index are
companies that have a higher sustainability
index than other companies. However,
further observations need to be made to
validate this conclusion.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of All Variables for the Whole Year
Variable
Min
Max
Dependent variable
BD
19
105
Theme (1) CPA
15
57
Theme (2) PAF
0
15
Theme (3) ELOSS
0
30
Theme (4) FG
0
5
Theme (5) FIN
0
6
Independent variable
Board Size
3
10
Board Independent
0,222
0,667
Women
0
0,429
Control Variable
Firm Size (Ln)
28,836
34,611
ROA
0,004
0,243
Leverage
0,012
0,828
Data source: Data processed by researchers

Further, in Table 3 above, we present
summarized descriptive statistics for all
variables (dependent, independent, and
control). From the table, what is interesting
is that the biodiversity disclosure of
companies in Indonesia is still quite low. If
53 points in the index are disclosed, the
total score that will be obtained is 159,
while the average score obtained is 58.4 or
36.7% disclosure. This requires special
attention from stakeholders to encourage
companies to contribute to efforts to
conserve biodiversity and disclose it in their
sustainability reports.
Biodiversity Disclosure Index Analysis
In this second stage, we declare the
total sample biodiversity disclosure score
while displaying the scores by theme and
year (see Table 4). The results display an
increase in the biodiversity disclosure of
companies in Indonesia, especially those
indexed in SRI-KEHATI. The average
disclosure scores for each year are 52.2,
58.2, and 64.9 for 2018, 2019, and 2020.
This indicates that overall, the company is
starting to realize the importance of the
issue of biodiversity. However, although
the overall score increased in this study, the
score is very low, considering the
maximum score that can be achieved by the
company is 53 items, with a maximum

Mean

SD

58,4
36,33
7,86
10,3
2,27
1,63

23,060
12,745
4,273
8,171
1,437
2,220

6,6
0,399
0, 151

1,940
0,124
0,127

31,551
0,065
0,379

1,519
0,064
0,286

score of 3 = 159 for each company. The
percentages for achievements in 2018 are
32.83%, 36.60% in 2019, and 40.82% in
2020, below half of the ideal disclosure
according to measurements from (Hassan et
al. 2020).
This improvement is also visible in
almost all themes. Starting from company
reports on current or previous actions
related to biodiversity conservation (CPA),
company strategies and future plans on biodiversity conservation (PAF), company reports on their contributions directly related
to biodiversity conservation (ELOSS) ),
and company reports on engagement and
compliance with several guidelines and
standards from organizations related to biodiversity conservation such as the Aichi
Biodiversity Target, UN SGDs, and other
guidelines (FG), as well as disclosure of
possible financial or legal penalties that
may be received by the company if ignore
this aspect and/or the lawsuit for environmental destruction that is being handled by
the company (FIN).
This increasing trend strengthens the
argument of previous research, which
declares that there is a collective call
globally for companies to be more aware
and motivated to contribute to the
preservation of biodiversity (Adler et al.
2018; Hassan et al. 2020).
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Table 4
Biodiversity Index Results by Year
Index
Min
19

2018
Max
80

Mean
52,2

Total Biodiversity
Disclosure (BD)
Index of Each Theme
Theme 1: CPA
16
51
35,3
Theme 2: PAF
0
13
6,2
Theme 3: ELOSS
0
21
8,1
Theme 4: FG
0
4
1,7
Theme 5: FIN
0
6
0,9
Data source: Data processed by researchers

Year of Observation
2019
Min
Max
Mean
21
92
58,2

15
1
3
1
0

51
14
27
5
6

35,0
8,3
10,4
2,5
1,9

Min
28

2020
Max
105

Mean
64,9

20
2
1
1
0

57
15
30
5
6

38,7
9,1
12,4
2,6
2,1

Table 5
Correlation Matrix
BD
BSize
BInd
1
0.384**
1
(0.0360)
BInd
-0.3649**
-0.7322***
1
(0.047)
(0.0000)
Wom
-0.1363
0.1600
-0.1503
(0.4728)
(0.3982)
(0.4279)
FSize
-0.0142
-0.0735
0.2624
(0.9406)
(0.6996)
(0.1613)
Prof
0.1522
0.5780***
-0.3400
(0.4219)
(0.0008)
0.0660
Lev
-0.2049
-0.2402
0.1052
(0.2774)
(0.2010)
(0.5801)
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
Data source: Data processed by researchers

Wom

FSize

Prof

Lev

BD
Bsize

Correlation and Multicollinearity
The two tables below, namely Tables
5 and 6, are the results of the Pearson
correlation and VIF (Variance inflation factor) test results. The Pearson correlation test
is used to explore the problem of autocorrelation, where variables have a strong relationship and influence each other. Taking a
threshold of 0.9 from several studies, such
as Hussain et al. (2018), Table 5 shows that
there is no strong correlation problem between variables in this study. VIF (Variance
inflation factor) is used to analyze the
correlation or strong relationship between
two or more independent variables in a
regression model. The assumption is that if
the VIF value is < 10, then there is no
multicollinearity problem. Table 6 shows
that the VIF value of all variables is below
10 meaning that the problem of
multicollinearity is not our concern.

1
-0.4627***
(0.0100)
0.4359***
(0.0161)
-0.4429*
(0.0142)

1
-0.5471***
(0.0018)
0.7053*
(0.0000)

1
-0.4521***
(0.0121)

1

Further examining the correlation results in table 5, it can be found that there is
a strong correlation between the size of the
board (BSize) and the proportion of independent boards (BInd) on the company's
biodiversity disclosure (BD). This provides
preliminary evidence for our hypothesis
that corporate governance is associated
with corporate biodiversity disclosure.
However, the univariate results do not capture other factors that influence BD. Therefore, a multivariate analysis should be
carried out to find more accurate results.
Due to the lack of observational data
in this study, we consider it important to test
whether the data is normally distributed or
not. We used two tests, namely the Shapiro
Wilk test and the Kolmogorov Smirnov
test. The results of these tests can be
depicted in the following Table 7.
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Table 6
Multicollinearity
Variable

VIF
7.36
4.65
1.41
5.82
3.85
3.44
Mean VIF
4.43
Data source: Data processed by researchers
Bsize
BInd
Wom
FSize
Prof
Lev

1/VIF
0.135790
0.214910
0.706834
0.171758
0.259609
0.290361

Table 7
Normality Test Results
Obs
Residual

30

Based on the results of the normality
test of the data with two different tests,
undoubtedly, the data in this study are
normally distributed. This can be
recognized from the p value of the residual
data which is above 0.05, so that the test
with panel data regression can be
continued.
Multivariate Analysis and Hypothesis
Testing
Following the procedure for selecting
a more appropriate regression model based
on research from Matuszak et al. (2019),
our research data tends to regression testing
using random effect (RE). First, we use the
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier
test to investigate if the data in this study are
more inclined to the OLS (pooled) model or
the random effect (RE) model. The results
show that the test value is 0.003 (p value
<0.05). Then it can be said that instead of
using the OLS model, the research data is
more directed to the RE model. Second, to
clarify whether RE is better than using FE
(Fixed Effect), Hausman test is used for this
need. The test value resulted in the number
0.6594 (rejected FE; accepted if p value <
0.05). So, it can be concluded that the data
structure is more accurate when using the
random effect regression (RE) model.
Table 8 proves the results of the random
effect regression.

Shapiro Wilk
(p value)
0.52811

Skewness/Kurtosis
(p value)
0.9105

We found that our first hypotheses
were accepted, and the other two were
rejected. The accepted hypothesis is that the
size of the company's board (H1) has a
positive effect on the company's
biodiversity disclosure with a p value =
0.000, below the specified significance
level of 5% (0.05). Meanwhile, what has
not been proven to affect the company's
biodiversity disclosure is the proportion of
Independent Commissioners (H2) and the
proportion of women board members (H3).
This positive effect on board size is
consistent with the findings of several
researchers (like Bae et al. 2018; Nasih et
al. 2019; Sun et al. 2021). Sun et al. (2021)
mention that boards with different types of
expertise, skills, and competencies are more
commonly on larger boards, and thus more
members on the board have greater ease in
fulfilling their function of monitoring
management. Thus a larger board size can
better ensure management participation in
long-term social and environmental
projects leading to more sustainability
disclosures (Bae et al. 2018).
Due to its large size, the board's
management supervision will be stricter so
that management will be more careful in
running the company's operations. This
condition can reduce agency conflicts and
send a positive signal to the community and
stakeholders that their interests are well
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Table 8
Regression Results (RE)
Variable
BoardSize

Expected Sign
+

BoardInd

+

Women

+

FirmSize

+

Profit

+

Lev

+

BD
6.453**
(0.000)
6.147
(0.901)
-34.904
(0.318)
-30.737
(0.481)
-104.975
(0.572)
-19.886
(0.564)

H1 Accepted
H2 Rejected
H3 Rejected

Konstanta

5.048
(0.982)
Obs
30
R-square
0.2055
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. We deliberately do not control the year because it is based on Test
linear hypotheses after estimation using the command 'testparm' on STATA 16. The results show
a value of 0.0535 > 0.05, which indicates that time control is not a significant problem in the
model. Data source: Data processed by researchers

represented (Bae et al. 2018; Matuszak et
al. 2019). Moreover, a large board also
depicts a diversity of experience,
competence, and background representing a
wider range of stakeholders (Sun et al.
2021). Larger board sizes are also more
likely to share workload and monitor
companies' environmental disclosure,
including their biodiversity disclosure
(Rossi et al. 2021).
Contrary to our expectations, the
Independent Commissioners are expected
to put greater pressure on management to
disclose social and environmental issues
because they represent a wider range of
stakeholders. According to Bae et al.
(2018), independent boards play an
effective and important role on behalf of
external stakeholders and the public
because of their skills, experience, external
(political) relations, high commitment, and
are not tied to the company's internal
interests. A more logical explanation for
this inconsistency is the country effect. This
study focuses on the relationship between
governance and biodiversity disclosure in
companies in Indonesia. The results of a
more specific study using Indonesia as a

sample have supported our findings (see
Nasih et al. 2019; Purbawangsa et al. 2019;
Trireksani and Djajadikerta 2016).
Purbawangsa et al. (2019) examined the
relationship between governance and corporate social-environmental disclosures in
developing countries, including Indonesia,
also found that the proportion of
Independent Commissioners does not affect
corporate sustainability disclosures. This
could be due to the small proportion of the
Independent Board, so it has been unable to
exert more influence. Table 3 shows that
the average proportion of Independent
Boards is 39%. So that it can be said that
companies in Indonesia are limited to
meeting the criteria set by the government,
which are required to have an Independent
Commissioner of at least 30% of the total
members of the Board of Commissioners.
The proportion of women on the
board is also not proven to have an effect on
the company's biodiversity disclosure. The
first reason, it can be seen from Table 3 that
the average proportion of female Board of
Commissioners is 15% and a maximum of
42%. In fact, some companies do not appear
to have female members of the Board of
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Commissioners. The low proportion of
women on the Board of Commissioners can
be the cause of their less influential
decisions to determine decisions and
policies related to biodiversity issues. The
second reason, this is also inseparable from
the culture and factors of the country where
the sample is taken (Naciti 2019). Women
have a positive effect on sustainability
reporting in developed countries (Alazzani
et al. 2019) like the United States (Hussain
et al. 2018); Poland (Matuszak et al. 2019);
and other countries in Europe and America
(Naciti 2019). So, the reason that is most
important to the conclusions of this study is
that Indonesia is still classified as a
developing country. Unlike developed
countries where gender equality is at a
higher level, patriarchal culture is still
deeply rooted in Indonesia (Syukur and
Bagshaw 2020). It is hoped that companies
in Indonesia can increase female members
on the Board of Commissioners to increase
diversity in the board so that, in the end, it
can improve reporting on corporate sustainability, especially reporting on biodiversity.
Finally, all control variables do not
significantly affect the company's biodiversity disclosure. This finding supports
the statement of Amran et al. (2021) that
research that discusses the drivers of nonfinancial reporting provides inconsistent
results. Some of them found that the
company's financial aspects, such as size,
leverage, and profitability, had a positive
relationship, while other studies proposed
the opposite findings. However, many
studies also found an insignificant relationship from this relationship. The size of the
company and the level of profitability of the
company do not affect the current level of
demand from stakeholders for companies to
disclose their sustainability performance,
regardless of the size and financial status of
the company. This finding is supported by
many studies (see Bae et al. 2018; Haque
and Jones 2020; Hussain et al. 2018; Nasih
et al. 2019; Roberts et al. 2021; Skouloudis
et al. 2019; Sun et al. 2021). Financial
leverage is also not a driving factor for bio-

diversity disclosure. This may imply that
creditors are not very interested in the nonfinancial performance information of the
company. They tend to use agreements to
protect their interests (according to the
research of Bae et al. 2018; Naciti 2019;
Sun et al. 2021).
CONCLUSION
The loss of biodiversity, either due to
human activities or nature itself, is one of
the biggest threats to the environment
globally (Mahyuddin et al. 2021;
Skouloudis et al. 2019). Therefore, contributions from various parties are needed. No
exception for companies based on data
from the Indonesian Biodiversity Strategy
and Action Plan (IBSAP), Indonesia ranks
first in the world for its biodiversity and
accounts for 15.5% of the flora and 10% of
the fauna. On the other hand, Indonesia has
a higher level of environmental risk than
other ASEAN countries.
Concerning the company's contribution to biodiversity conservation and
extinction prevention, we find that
corporate governance mechanisms play an
important role. The size of the Board of
Commissioners has a positive effect on the
company's biodiversity disclosure. The
larger the board size allows for the diversity
of skills, experience and expertise on the
board. In addition, the larger the board
permits them to divide the tasks and will be
able to focus on sustainability issues.
Meanwhile, independent commissioners
and women's boards have not yet become a
determining factor for the company's biodiversity disclosure. This is inseparable from
the characteristics of the country and
culture. It seems that companies in
Indonesia only meet the minimum requirements of an Independent Commissioner.
The patriarchal culture is also still deeply
rooted in Indonesian society, so the two
attributes of the board have not yet
effectively played their role.
Overall, we can conclude that the
company's attention to preserving eco-
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systems and biodiversity is still very low
and inadequate, contrary to what many have
hoped for. We use a sample of companies
from SRI-KEHATI to assume that companies included in the index can represent
other companies in terms of sustainability
performance. However, our findings yield
contradictory results, particularly about the
company's biodiversity disclosure. This is
due to the low understanding of companies
and market players on the concept of
sustainability and related issues that should
be of concern to companies and disclosed in
their reports.
This
research
has
practical
implications for several related parties. For
academics, this research can be the initial
foundation to provide an overview of how
to practice biodiversity accounting in
Indonesia. Research on the disclosure of
biodiversity is still very limited, so it can
still be explored more deeply. For
companies, this research proves that
biodiversity reporting is only affected by
the size of the Board of Commissioners.
The company is expected to be more
involved in the Independent Board and
female members of the Board of
Commissioners in dealing with sustainability issues, especially the issue of
biodiversity.
This research is far from perfect.
There are still many limitations attached to
this simple research. For this reason, we
will mention this study's limitations and
provide direction for future research. These
limitations include (i) the sample is still
limited and requires future research to
expand the sample size. Our initial
assumption is that companies included in
the SRIKEHATI index can represent the
disclosure and sustainability performance
of companies in Indonesia. However, many
companies still do not publish their
complete sustainability reports on their
respective websites. Many of them also do
not make the issue of biodiversity one of the
main concerns. (ii) The measures that we
use as proxies for governance include the
size, the proportion of the Independent
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Commissioners, and the proportion of
women members of the board of
commissioners. Many sustainability studies
have tried to examine the influence of the
background of members of the Board of
Commissioners, such as their education and
experience. Future biodiversity accounting
research could use this as a proxy for
corporate governance. (iii) To provide more
in-depth results, future research can also be
carried out using qualitative methods, such
as conducting interviews with company
management. This approach is very
important to explain how the size of the
Board of Commissioners can affect the
disclosure of biodiversity, as found in this
study. Furthermore, a study employing a
descriptive-qualitative method on the
content of biodiversity disclosure, as done
by Adler et al. (2018) could help
researchers to investigate further how the
pattern of companies in Indonesia in
revealing their biodiversity.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1;

Sustainability Reports and Biodiversity Disclosure Checklist
No

Code

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

ASII
AUTO
BBCA
BBNI
BBRI
BBTN
BMRI
BSDE
DSNG
INCO
INDF
INTP
JSMR
KLBF
LSIP
NISP
PGAS
PJAA
PTPP
SIDO

21
22

SMGR
TLKM

23
24
25
26
27
28
29

UNTR
UNVR
WIKA
ADHI
JPFA
WSKT
WTON

Company Name
Astra International Tbk.
Astra Otoparts Tbk.
Bank Central Asia Tbk.
Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk.
Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk.
Bank Tabungan Negara (Persero) Tbk.
Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk.
Bumi Serpong Damai Tbk.
Dharma Satya Nusantara Tbk.
Vale Indonesia Tbk.
Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk.
Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa Tbk.
Jasa Marga (Persero) Tbk.
Kalbe Farma Tbk.
PP London Sumatra Indonesia Tbk.
Bank OCBC NISP Tbk.
Perusahaan Gas Negara Tbk.
Pembangunan Jaya Ancol Tbk.
PP (Persero) Tbk.
Industri Jamu dan Farmasi Sido
Muncul Tbk.
Semen Indonesia (Persero) Tbk.
Telekomunikasi Indonesia (Persero)
Tbk.
United Tractors Tbk.
Unilever Indonesia Tbk.
Wijaya Karya (Persero) Tbk.
Adhi Karya (Persero) Tbk.
Japfa Comfeed Indonesia Tbk
Waskita Karya (Persero) Tbk.
Wijaya Karya Beton Tbk.

Sustainability
Report
18
19
20
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Appendix 2;
Company Biodiversity Disclosure Index (Hassan et al., 2020)
Code

CPA1

CPA2

CPA3
CPA4
CPA5
CPA6
CPA7
CPA8
CPA9
CPA10
CPA11
CPA12
CPA13
CPA14
CPA15
CPA16
CPA17
CPA18
CPA19
CPA20
CPA21
CPA22
CPA23
CPA24
CPA25
CPA26

Disclosure Items
Company report on current/previous actions
Company reports on corporate expressions of moral, ethical, and/or emotional motivations
for preserving species and preventing extinction with a consideration of ecosystem level
effects, including normative reflective self-accounts of the company's impact on threatened
and endangered species.
Company report on partnership engagement between wildlife/nature/conservation
organisations and the company which aim to address corporate impacts on endangered
species.
Company report on assessment and reflection on outcome/impact of
engagement/partnerships and decisions taken about necessary changes to policy/initiatives
going forward.
Company provides pictorial representation of success in conservation.
Company report on provision of education/training delivered on extinction accounting to all
employees.
Company report on support given at managerial level, ensure understanding of extinction
accounting by decision makers.
Company report on its involvement in afforestation activities (such as seedling
transplantation, forest plantation, sustainable forestry practices, or other reforestation
activities).
Company reports its involvement in protection/conservation of “Ecological corridors” in and
around the manufacturing plants, mines, transport infrastructure, and/or other locations.
Company report on “biodiversity assessment” of its activities in and around the
manufacturing plants, mines, transport infrastructure, and/or other locations.
Company report on implementation of “biodiversity offset” for reducing their biodiversity
impacts.
Company report on biodiversity partners (both local and international organisations) helping
company in biodiversity conservation.
Company report on biodiversity projects undertaken to enhance the biodiversity in and
around the manufacturing plants, mines, transport infrastructure and/or other locations.
Company report on its involvement in land management/land rehabilitation activities.
Company reports on floral wealth in or around its operating area (production/functional/
transportation).
Company discloses the faunal wealth in or around its operating area (production/functional/
transportation).
Company reports on donation provided (or conducted philanthropic activities) which
contributed to the conservation, protection, enhancement, promotion, and preservation of
biodiversity.
Company reports steps taken for creating biodiversity awareness among its employees or in
the community.
Company report on participation in biodiversity associations (external agencies, NGOs) to
improve biodiversity practices in the community.
Company reports on amount spent (R&D, technologies, innovations) for biodiversity
conservation/restoration.
Company reports on environment policy strategy (or statement) values (or concerns)
biodiversity.
Company reports biodiversity award or recognition received for biodiversity conservation/
restoration.
Company reports biodiversity in top-level management plan.
Company reports international conventions for biodiversity conservation and restoration.
Company reports regular assessments (audit) of species populations in areas affected by
corporate operations.
Explain how these have been integrated into the company's internal control system, business
model, business strategy. and operational plans.
Company reports biodiversity action plan or biodiversity goals/targets for coming years.
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PAF27
PAF28
PAF29
PAF30
PAF31
PAF32
PAF33
PAF34
ELOSS35
ELOSS36
ELOSS37
ELOSS38
ELOSS39
ELOSS40
ELOSS41
ELOSS42
ELOSS43
ELOSS44
ELOSS45
ELOSS46
ELOSS47

FG48

FG49

FG50
FG51
FIN52
FIN53
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Prevent activities happening in the future
Report on potential risks/impacts on these specific species arising from the company's
operations.
Report assessment of whether or not corporate initiatives/actions are assisting in prevention
of future species extinction.
Report strategy for the future development and improvement of actions/initiatives.
Include a discussion of ways in which the company is working to prevent future liabilities
related to harming endangered species.
Offering where possible future graduate schemes on extinction accounting.
In the future, collaborate with key advisors across professions to conceptualise accounts and
progress with ecologists, scientists, humanities scholars, and other experts
Update shareholders/stakeholders quarterly with progress and future actions,
Provide education on extinction initiatives to schools in future,
Report on activities contributing to extinction/biodiversity loss
Record a list of plant and animal species, identified as endangered by the IUCN Red List,
whose habitats are affected by the company's activities
Report where, geographically, the company's activities pose a threat to endangered plant and
animal species, as identified by the IUCN Red List
Report and assess habitat status area protected, restored, affected, and conserved.
Report on potential risks/impacts on these specific species arising from the company's
operations.
Company reports operations (countries) with activities in IUCN category I–IV protected
areas.
Company reports the native/indigenous/endemic species affected/conserved/protected/
restored.
Company reports ecosystems affected/conserved/protected/restored.
Company reports wetlands affected/conserved/protected/restored.
Company reports marine biodiversity affected/conserved/protected/restored.
Company reports rivers, creeks, lakes, reservoirs, or waterways affected/conserved/protected/
restored.
Company report by incorporate images (photos or drawings, for example) of threatened
species which are affected by the company's operations and which the company need to
protect.
Provide pictorial representation of failure, that is, species loss.
Report on company’s biodiversity/species loss due to its operations.
Report on guidelines or adopt the following
Ensure that the whole process of “extinction accounting” is integrated into corporate strategy
and is incorporated into the company's “integrated report,” not resigned to separate
sustainability reports or websites, including species specific information.
Report on compliance of United Nations Sustainability Development Goal (No15) Life on
Land 15.5. Take urgent and significant action to reduce the degradation of natural habitats,
halt the loss of biodiversity and, by 2020, protect and prevent the extinction of threatened
species.
Report on compliance of Aichi Target 12—By 2020, the extinction of known threatened
species has been prevented and their conservation status, particularly of those most in decline,
has been improved and sustained.
Report using International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) framework.
Report on company fines
Report potential liabilities relating to future possible legal fines/claims relating to endangered
species impacts
Report full details (narrative as well as financial figures) relating to any fines or ongoing
claims relating to endangered species legislation including the names of species and a
summary of losses suffered with causes identified

